A balancing act: managing financial constraints and agency costs to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market by Guariglia, A. & Yang, J.
This is a repository copy of A balancing act: managing financial constraints and agency 
costs to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market.




Guariglia, A. and Yang, J. (2016) A balancing act: managing financial constraints and 
agency costs to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 36. pp. 111-130. ISSN 1872-6313 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.006





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
A balancing act: managing financial constraints and agency costs to 
minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market 
 
 
Alessandra Guarigliaa,*, Junhong Yangb  
 
 
a Department of Economics; University of Birmingham; Birmingham B15 2TT;  
United Kingdom 
b Management School; University of Sheffield; Conduit Road; Sheffield S10 1FL;  





Using a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 1998-2014, we document strong 
evidence of investment inefficiency, which we explain through a combination of financing 
constraints and agency problems. Specifically, we argue that firms with cash flow below 
(above) their optimal level tend to under- (over-)invest as a consequence of financial 
constraints (agency costs). Furthermore, focusing on under-investing firms, we highlight that 
the sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow rise with traditionally used 
measures of financing constraints, whilst for over-investing firms, the sensitivities increase 
with a wide range of firm-specific measures of agency costs.  
 
Keywords:  Under-investment; Over-investment, Free cash flow; Financial constraints; 
Agency costs; China 





                                                             
   * Corresponding author.  







1. Introduction  
Problems of information asymmetry between management and financial institutions, and 
agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors, as well as between 
management and shareholders have been found to significantly influence firms’ investment 
decisions (Myers & Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Fazzari et al. 1988; Abhyankar et al. 2005; 
Jiang et al. 2010). These problems are particularly severe in emerging markets. Given the 
significant capital market imperfections characterizing it and its poor corporate governance 
mechanisms (Allen et al., 2005), the Chinese setting provides an ideal laboratory to study 
firms’ investment decisions in the presence of both financial constraints and agency 
problems1.  
China has been seen as a counter-example to most of the literature, which suggests a 
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth (Levine 2005).  Its 
under-developed financial system is in fact seriously out of step with its thriving growth 
(Allen et al. 2005).2 Internal finance, trade credit, and other informal funds might speak 
louder than bank or equity finance in explaining the Chinese growth miracle. In other words, 
the role of China’s external markets in financing and allocating resources has been limited. 
 This is due, first of all, to the fact that dominant state-owned banks are not efficient 
since they have plenty of nonperforming loans (NPLs). More importantly, they need to 
support massive unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is consequently difficult for 
private firms to access external funding (Allen et al. 2005; Héricourt & Poncet 2009; 
Guariglia et al. 2011). Second, although it has grown in recent years, the Chinese stock 
market is still relatively small compared with the banking sector. Due to poor regulation and 
to  the fact that a substantial number of listed firms are controlled by the state, the stock 
market is not very efficient and stock prices do not reflect fundamental values (Allen et al. 
2005; Wang et al. 2009). Financial markets in China have therefore not been playing a very 
efficient role in allocating resources and relieving financial constraints, which are a 
                                                             
1 Some researchers (e.g. Bernanke  Gertler, 1989) refer to agency costs as those deadweight losses, which, in 
the presence of asymmetric information, prevent to reach optimal financial arrangeme ts between borrowers 
and lenders. These agency costs translate themselves in a higher cost of external finance compared to internal 
funds. Hereafter, we refer to these as financing constraints, and only consider as agency problems those arising 
from conflicts of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, or between managers and
shareholders.  
2 According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Statistical Yearbook of China (various issues), China has 
experienced a rapid growth rate, which reached an average of 13.2% per year over the 1998-2014 period in 
terms of GDP (gross domestic product). This incredibly fast growth relied heavily on investment. Over the 
period 1998-2014, the country experienced in fact an investment boom (the average annual growth rate for total 
fixed investment was 19.7%), which was responsible for around 50% of GDP growth (NBS Statistical Yearbook 
of China, various issues). 
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significant issue for several Chinese firms, and may lead them to under-invest3.   
At the same time, given the weak legal system and poor corporate governance 
mechanisms that characterize the country, agency problems are rather severe and likely to 
lead to over-investment in China’s listed sector (Allen et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2011). For 
instance,  government bureaucrats may use their influence to over-invest in order to achieve 
their political objectives (Firth et al. 2012). These effects may be amplified by the presence of 
soft budget constraints4, and widespread corruption (Chow et al. 2010; Firth et al. 2012). 
Excessive investment might cause over-heating and over-capacity, and generate inefficiency, 
which could impair the sustainable development and future wellbeing in China. 
Our work makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we examine under- 
and over-investment at the same time, as we believe that these two types of abnormal 
investment are likely to coexist in China. Second, unlike most prior research, which examines 
sensitivities of investment to cash flow (Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Cleary 
1999; Cummins et al. 2006), we focus on the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash 
flow. By deducting required (maintenance) and expected investments from capital 
expenditure, and removing mandated components from cash flow, this approach prevents free 
cash flow from picking up future investment opportunities. Consequently, in the absence of 
financing constraints and agency costs, under- and over-investment should not display a 
systematic response to free cash flow. Our approach provides therefore a powerful and 
unambiguous test which will help shed light on whether investment inefficiencies in the 
unique Chinese context can be explained by financial constraints and/or agency problems. 
Third, our analysis provides evidence on the extent to which heterogeneity in the degree of 
financing constraints and agency costs faced by firms affects the sensitivities of under- and 
over-investment to free cash flow.  
Our study is conducted using a large panel of listed Chinese firms over the period 
1998-2014. We analyze the sensitivity of (under- and over-) investment to free cash flow 
across groups of firms sorted according to different characteristics. In doing so, we adopt the 
framework proposed by Richardson (2006) to construct firm-level under- and over- 
                                                             
3  Hereafter, we define over-investment (under-investment) as investment expenditure beyond (below) its 
optimal level. We therefore refer to both under- and over-investment as abnormal investment. In addition, we 
argue that the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow can be seen as evidence of investment 
inefficiency due to financial constraints and/or agency problems. It should be noted that there are other ways to 
measure investment inefficiency: for instance, Chen et al. (2014) focus on the sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to Tobin’s Q. 
4 In the presence of soft budget constraints, state-owned enterprises are in fact always bailed out even if they 
suffer from chronic losses. 
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investment and free cash flow measures. Our empirical results show that a combination of 
both financing constraints and agency problems explains investment inefficiency in the 
unique Chinese context. In particular, our findings are consistent with the financial 
constraints hypothesis (Fazzari et al. 1988): higher sensitivities of under-investment to free 
cash flow are found for the firms with cash flow below their optimal levels, which are more 
likely to face financing constraints. Our results are also in line with the agency costs 
hypothesis (Jensen 1986): higher sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow are spotted 
in firms with cash flow above their optimal levels, which are more likely to suffer from 
agency problems. These results are robust to the use of alternative measures of abnormal 
investment and free cash flow, of different estimation methodologies, and of various 
alternative criteria to define financial constraints and agency costs. 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 develops testable 
hypotheses regarding firms’ investment behavior and its relationship with financial 
constraints and agency problems. Section 3 illustrates the methodology we use to measure 
abnormal investment and free cash flow. Section 4 presents our baseline specifications and 
estimation methodology. Section 5 describes the main features of the data and presents 
summary statistics. Section 6 discusses and examines our main empirical results and some 
robustness tests. Section 7 analyzes the extent to which heterogeneity in the degree of 
financing constraints and agency costs faced by firms affects the sensitivities of under- and 
over-investment to free cash flow. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Development of hypotheses 
In a perfect and complete capital market, investment decisions are not affected by the way 
firms finance themselves (Modigliani & Miller 1958), suggesting that in order to maximize 
their value, firms will implement investment projects until their marginal revenue equals their 
marginal cost. However, substantial empirical evidence has documented a significantly 
positive correlation between cash flow and investment expenditure (Fazzari et al. 1988; 
Hubbard, 1998; Cleary, 1999; Cumming et al., 2006; Bond & Van Reenen, 2007). The reason 
for the existence of this positive relation remains, however, controversial.  
First, there exists considerable evidence to suggest that the positive correlation 
between investment and cash flow stems from asymmetric information between corporate 
insiders and outside creditors (Myers & Majluf 1984; Fazzari et al. 1988; Carpenter & 
Guariglia 2008). This can be explained considering that when external finance such as bank 
loans, debt and equity are used, the imperfections in capital markets lead to a cost premium. 
5 
The cost and/or availability of external funds force firms to use internal finance, like retained 
earnings, in preference to external finance. In these circumstances, financially constrained 
firms may have to forego good investment projects to avoid the excessively high cost 
premiums associated with the use of external finance. Thus, when firms face financial 
constraints, negative cash flow shocks may lead to under-investment. A high sensitivity of 
under-investment to free cash flow can therefore be seen as evidence of financial constraints. 
We refer to this as the financing constraints (FC) hypothesis (H1): 
 
H1: Financing Constraints (FC) Hypothesis: Firms which are ex-ante more likely to 
face financing constraints, exhibit higher sensitivities of under-investment to free cash 
flow. 
 
Second, the positive correlation between investment and cash flow may reflect two 
types of agency problems: those between controlling shareholder and minority investors, and 
those between managers and shareholders (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; Pawlina & Renneboog 
2005). In the Chinese context, given the weak legal system, the high restriction of share 
trading, and the prevalence of dominant shareholders, the first type of agency problems has 
been found to be prevalent (Liu & Lu, 2007; Jiang et al., 2010). The risk of controlling 
shareholders expropriating resources from minority investors (tunneling) is in fact severe. As 
a result, controlling shareholders are likely to make self-interested and entrenched decisions 
and prefer to spend the firm’s free cash flow on unprofitable projects rather than paying 
dividends to shareholders, resulting in over-investment. In summary, when firms face agency 
problems (and in particular are more likely to be subject to tunneling), the more free cash 
flow they have, the more they prefer to invest, which could lead to over-investment. A 
positive relationship between over-investment and free cash flow can hence be interpreted as 
evidence of the presence of agency problems. We refer to this as the agency costs (AC) 
hypothesis (H2): 
 
H2: Agency Cost (AC) Hypothesis: Firms which are ex-ante more likely to face 
agency problems, exhibit higher sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow. 
 
Taken together, financial constraints and agency problems can prevent firms from 
making optimal investment decisions. In other words, both financial constraints and agency 
problems may increase the sensitivity of investment expenditure to free cash flow and induce 
investment inefficiency. To discriminate between these two scenarios within the Chinese 
6 
context, we test hypotheses H1 and H2. Both hypotheses are focused on the sensitivity of 
abnormal investment to free cash flow, which is defined as the cash flow beyond what is 
required to maintain assets and finance expected new investments (Richardson 2006). In the 
two sections that follow, we outline the methodology that we adopt to test these two 
hypotheses. 
 
3. Methodology  used to measure abnormal investment and free cash flow 
 
3.1. A framework to measure abnormal investment and free cash flow  
We measure both under- and over-investment (abnormal investment) and  free cash flow 
(FCF) using Richardson’s (2006) accounting-based framework. Fig.1 outlines our 
methodology.  
Total investment (I_totali,t) is defined as capital expenditure less receipts from the sale 
of property, plant, and equipment5. I_totali,t can be decomposed into two main parts: new 
investment expenditure (I_newi,t), and required investment expenditure to maintain assets in 
place (I_main.i,t), which is given by the sum of amortization and depreciation.   
[Insert Fig. 1] 
New investment expenditure (I_newi,t) can be further split into two components: 
expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects (Ie_newi,t), which is described 
in the next sub-section, and unexpected investment or abnormal investment (under- or over- 
investment, Iu_newi,t).  
We then define firms’ optimal level of cash flow as the sum of maintenance 
investment (I_main.i,t) and expected investment expenditure (Ie_newi,t). Free cash flow (FCF) 
is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow (I_main.i,t + Ie_newi,t) from net 
cash flow from operating activities (CFO)6. Accordingly, FCF can be either positive or 
negative, depending on whether net cash flow from operating activities (CFO) exceeds the 
optimal level of cash flow. 
 
 
                                                             
5 It should be noted that Richardson (2006) also includes acquisitions and Research and Development (R&D) 
expenditure in his proxy for total investment. We chose to use a more parsimonious proxy for two reasons. The 
first is that capital expenditure is generally used in the finance and economics literatures as a proxy for 
investment (Hubbard, 1998). The second is that R&D expenditure is not available in our data. Contrary to us, 
Richardson (2006) also includes R&D expenditures in his proxy for free cash flow. 
6 The reason why we deduct expected investment expenditure (Ie_n wi,t) rather than actual CAPEX to calculate 
FCF is because actual CAPEX can be influenced by financial constraints or agency costs. 
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3.2. Dynamic expectation models of investment expenditure 
Following Richardson (2006), a dynamic investment expectation model is used to predict the 
expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects (Ie_newi,t), which can be 
interpreted as the optimal level of investment expenditure7. Specifically, denoting with I_new 
the firm’s new investment expenditure; with Q (Tobin’s Q), its market-to-book ratio;8 with 
Cash, its ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; with Size, the natural logarithm of 
its total assets; with Age, the number of years elapsed since its listing; with ROA, its return on 
assets9; and with Leverage, the ratio of its short-term and long-term debt to total assets, we 
estimate the following  equation:  荊ｅ券結拳沈┸痛 噺 欠待 髪 欠怠荊ｅ券結拳沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠態系欠嫌月沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠戴芸沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠替鯨件権結沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠泰畦訣結沈┸痛貸怠髪 欠滞迎頚畦沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠胎詣結懸結堅欠訣結沈┸痛貸怠 髪 懸沈 髪 懸痛 髪 懸珍 髪 懸椎 髪 懸珍┸痛 髪 綱沈┸痛   岫な岻 
where the subscript i indexes firms; t indexes years (t=1998-2014); j, industries; and p, 
provinces. We use a dynamic model to allow for a partial adjustment mechanism and to 
control for unobserved factors not included among other regressors. We lag all our 
independent variables (except Age) to alleviate the simultaneity issue (Polk & Sapienza 2009; 
Duchin et al. 2010). 
The error term in Eq. (1) is made up of five components. vi is a firm-specific effect; vt, 
a time-specific effect, which we control for by including time dummies capturing business 
cycle effects; vj, is an industry-specific effect, which we take into account by including 
industry dummies; vp, is a province-specific effect capturing uneven developments across 
different provinces, which we control for by including province dummies; and vj,t takes into 
account industry-specific business cycles, which we control by including industry dummies 
interacted with time dummies. Finally, i,t is an idiosyncratic component. 
Estimates of Eq. (1) obtained using the fixed-effects estimator (Fe) and the system 
GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998) are presented and discussed in the Appendix. The 
                                                             
7 All investment expenditure variables are scaled by total assets. 
8 The shares of listed firms in China can be either tradable or non-tradable. Following the literature (Chen et al. 
2011; Huang et al. 2011), we calculate Tobin’s Q as the sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book 
value of non-tradable stocks, and the market value of net debt divided by the book value of total assets. Our 
results were robust to using the growth of real sales instead of Tobin’s Q to proxy for investment opportunities 
(Konings et al. 2003). This test is motivated by the fact that in the Chinese context, Tobin’s Q may be an 
imperfect measure of investment opportunities.  
9 As firms in a less developed market may not make investment decisions based on market valuation (Wang et 
al. 2009), contrary to Richardson (2006), we use the return on assets (ROA) instead of stock returns in our 
dynamic investment model. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
8 
fitted values of Eq. (1) can be interpreted as a proxy for optimal investment (Ie_newi,t)10. The 
difference between real investment and optimal investment (Iu_newi,t) is then computed and 
interpreted as unexpected investment. Iu_newi,t can be either positive or negative, 
corresponding to over-investment or under-investment, respectively.  
We next test whether there exists a statistically significant relationship between 
abnormal investment and FCF and, if it does, whether it stems from financing constraints 
and/or agency costs. 
 
4. Baseline specifications 
 
4.1. Main specification 
To analyze the sensitivities of under- or over-investment to free cash flow, we initially 
estimate the following regression: 
 荊通ｅ券結拳沈┸痛 噺 欠待 髪 欠怠経憲兼庁寵庁苧待 髪 欠態繋系繋沈┸痛 茅 経憲兼庁寵庁猪待 髪 欠戴繋系繋沈┸痛 茅 経憲兼庁寵庁苧待 髪 懸沈 髪 懸痛 髪 綱沈┸痛   岫に岻 
                                                                 
We partition firm-years into those characterized by over-investment or under-investment on 
the basis of their Iu_newi,t. More specifically, over-investing (under-investing) firms are those 
who have positive (negative) abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t). We then investigate whether 
the sensitivity of Iu_newi,t to FCF differs for firms facing positive and negative FCF, whereby 
the former are more likely to be affected by agency problems, while the latter are more likely 
to suffer from financing constraints 11. To this end, we interact FCF with the dummy 
DumFCF>0 (DumFCF<0), which is equal to 1 if the firm has positive (negative) free cash flow, 
and 0 otherwise. In accordance with the financing constraints hypothesis (H1), we expect a2 
to be positive and precisely determined for under-investing firms, while, in line with the 
agency costs hypothesis (H2), a3 should be positive and significant for over-investing firms12. 
We also include the dummy DumFCF>0 in the regression, to account for the direct effect that it 
                                                             
10 All our results were robust to estimating a more parsimonious version of Eq. (1) only including lagged 
investment, Q, and the dummies. 
11 Because free cash flow is defined as operating cash flow net of depreciation and amortization and net of 
Ie_newi,t, positive sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow are unlikely to be caused by free cash 
flow picking up investment opportunities. Our results were generally robust to estimating a dynamic version of 
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). 
12 It is important to note that the same firm may face both financial constraints and agency costs at the same time. 
However, we believe that financing constraints are more pronounced for unde -investing firms with negative 
free cash flow, and that agency costs are more pronounced for over-investing firms with positive free cash flow. 
See footnotes 21 and 27 for a further discussion of this point. 
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might have on corporate investment. Finally, we control for business cycle effects.13  
 
4.2. Are under- or over-investment-free cash flow sensitivities due to financial constraints or 
agency costs? 
To further test for the financial constraints (FC) hypothesis of under-investment and the 
agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment, we next estimate the following regression: 
 荊憲ｅ券結拳沈┸痛 噺 欠待 髪 欠怠経憲兼 髪 欠態繋系繋沈┸痛 茅 経憲兼 髪 欠戴繋系繋沈┸痛 茅 岫な 伐 経憲兼岻 髪 懸沈 髪 懸痛 髪 綱沈┸痛     (3) 
where Dum represents a dummy proxying for the degree of financial constraints or agency 
costs faced by firms. Specifically, we separate firms into different groups on the basis of their 
a priori likelihood of facing financial constraints or agency problems measured using 
different criteria, with the aim of investigating the extent to which different groups of firms 
have different sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash flow. These further 
tests should enable us to shed more light on whether the financing constraints and agency 
costs hypotheses can explain investment inefficiency in the Chinese context. We estimate Eq. 
(2) and Eq. (3) using the fixed effects (Fe) estimator to control for time-invariant firm-
specific heterogeneity.14  
 
5. Main features of the data and descriptive statistics  
 
5.1. The dataset 
The data used in this paper are drawn from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) Database and China Center for Economics Research (CCER) Database. They 
cover Chinese companies that issue A-share stocks on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), during the period 1998-2014. We exclude 
financial institutions since the operating, investing and financing activities of these firms are 
distinct from others. We further winsorize observations in the one percent tails for the main 
                                                             
13 We do not include industry- and province-specific effects in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) because we estimate these 
equations using a fixed-effects estimator and these effects would be cancelled out through the differencing 
process. Furthermore, industry-specific business cycle effects do not appear in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) because some 
of the dummies take on the value 1 for all observations in a cluster, and 0 otherwise (a singleton indicator). This 
causes singular outer-product-of-gradients (OPG) variance matrices in computing the robust standard errors, 
which therefore makes it impossible to compute an overall model F-statistic.  
14 The key variables in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) (unexpected investment and free cash flow) are constructed using the 
residuals from the estimation of Eq. (1). For this reason, they can be considered as exogenous, which justifies 
the use of a fixed-effects estimator. 
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regression variables to minimize the potential influence of outliers.  Finally, we drop all firms 
with less than three years of consecutive observations. All variables are deflated using the 
gross domestic product (GDP) deflator (National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
Our final panel consists of 2,113 listed firms, which corresponds to 22,373 firm-year 
observations. The number of firm-year observations of each firm varies from three to 
seventeen, with number of observations varying from a minimum of 576 in 1998 to a 
maximum of 2,026 in 2012.15  
 
5.2.  Initial summary statistics 
In order to study the relationship between abnormal (under- or over-) investment and free 
cash flow, we partition firm-years into 4 sub-groups: Group 1 (under-investing firms with 
negative FCF), Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF), Group 3 (over-investing 
firms with positive FCF), and Group 4 (over-investing firms with negative FCF). These 
groups are illustrated in Fig. 2. Means and medians for the entire sample and four sub-
samples based on their abnormal investments and free cash flow are presented in Table 1.  
It can be seen that relative to total assets, the average total investment and new 
investment expenditure in our sample are respectively 5.8% and 2.8%. This suggests that new 
investment represents a large portion of total investment (around 50%). Moreover, the 
average free cash flow for all firm-years observations is -0.01. This small value might suggest 
that listed firms in China are short of free cash flow, which could be due to financial 
constraints. 
[Insert Table 1 and Fig. 2] 
Interestingly, the total new investment for Group 2 (under-investing firms with 
positive FCF) is negative. This happens because the depreciation plus amortization of firms 
in this group exceeds their total investment. Depreciation and amortization can be considered 
as non-cash expenses: if firms are profitable, they might accelerate depreciation and 
amortization in order to reduce reported profits.  
Coming to unexpected investment and free cash flow, we observe that firms in Group 
1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF) have the highest negative unexpected 
investments and negative free cash flow, which is in line with the hypothesis according to 
which, due to financial constraints, firms with negative FCF tend to under-invest. As for 
                                                             
15 See Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for details on the structure of our sample. Around 18 percent of firms 
have the full 17-year observations. Our panel is unbalanced, allowing for both entry and exit. This can be seen 
as evidence of dynamism and may reduce potential selection and survivor bias. 
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firms in Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF), they have the second highest 
positive unexpected investment and the highest free cash flow, which is in line with the 
hypothesis according to which firms with positive FCF tend to over-invest due to agency 
costs. 
As for other financial and operating variables, the statistics show that compared to 
firms in other groups, firms in Group 1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF) are 
relatively younger, smaller, and have lower ROA and high cash reserves. This could suggest 
the presence of financial constraints. On the other hand, firms in Group 3 (over-investing 
firms with positive FCF) are relatively mature, large, and have high Tobin’s Q, which might 
suggest higher agency problems.16  
Finally, it is interesting to note that the number of firm-years in Group 1 (6,355 
observations) is larger than that in Group 3 (3,785 observations), suggesting that there are 
more firms facing financial constraints than firms susceptible to agency problems.  
 
6. Main empirical results 
 
6.1. Baseline results 
Table 2 presents the key results from the estimation of the relationship between under- and 
over-investment and negative/positive free cash flow obtained using the fixed effects 
estimator (Eq. 2). Columns 1 and 2 are based on estimates of Iu_newi,t obtained by estimating 
Eq. (1) with system GMM. We observe that the free cash flow coefficients are only 
significantly positive (at the 1% level) for the under-investing firms with negative free cash 
flow, which are more likely to suffer from financing constraints (Group 1, column 1); and the 
over-investing firms with positive free cash flow, which are more likely to suffer from agency 
problems (Group 3, column 2). These findings support our hypotheses H1 and H2. Similar 
results are found in columns 3 and 4, which are based on estimates of Iu_newi,t  obtained from 
fixed effects estimates of Eq. (1) 17. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
                                                             
16 The p-values associated with the t-tests and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test show significant differences in these 
variables between firms in Group 1 and those in Group 3. 
17 With the exception of columns 2 and 4, the p-values associated with the Wald tests show significant 
differences in the free cash flow coefficients between firms facing negative and positive FCF. Yet, in columns 2 
and 4, only the coefficient associated with FCF interacted with the dummy for FCF>0 is statistically significant.  
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6.2. Robustness tests 
 
6.2.1.  Using a quantile estimator 
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate Eq. (2) using a quantile estimator with fixed 
effects. Specifically, we run separate regressions for the 20th, 50th and 80th quantiles of the 
distribution of Iu_newi,t, and differentiate the FCF coefficients across firms with negative and 
positive FCF. The advantage of using this estimator is that it enables us to examine how free 
cash flow influences firms’ abnormal investment for firms with different levels of abnormal 
investment. The results, which are reported in columns 1 to 6 of Table 3, are in line with our 
prior findings: we observe a positive and significant relationship between free cash flow and 
abnormal investment, stronger for the under-investing firms with negative FCF and the over-
investing firms with positive FCF.  
More specifically, for under-investing firms, we observe a decreasing trend of the 
coefficients associated with FCF*DumFCF<0 when we move from the smallest quantile of 
abnormal investment (0.090) to the largest (0.033). This suggests that for firms with free cash 
flow below their optimal level, more under-investment goes hand in hand with higher FCF 
sensitivities.  
For over-investing firms, we find evidence of an increasing trend for the coefficients 
associated with FCF*DumFCF>0 moving from the smallest quantile of abnormal investment 
(0.020) to the largest (0.061). This indicates that for firms with free cash flow above their 
optimal level, more over-investment is accompanied by higher FCF sensitivities. The p-
values associated with the test for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients between 
firms with positive and negative FCF show that these differences are generally significant. 
This confirms the robustness of our previous results. 
 [Insert Table 3] 
 
6.2.2.  Alternative ways of measuring under-/over-investing firms 
Bergstresser (2006) notes that the distinction between under-investment and over-investment 
based on Richardson (2006)’s approach might have some flaws as, in a dynamic setting, ex-
post abnormal investment may follow ex-ante abnormal investment, causing mean reversion. 
To take this problem into account, as a further robustness test, predicted abnormal investment 
is obtained using the fitted values from the model in Eq. (1) estimated in each year using 
OLS. The results, reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 3, are consistent with our prior 
findings: positive and significant coefficients on free cash flow are observed only for under-
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investing firms with negative FCF and over-investing firms with positive FCF.    
Alternatively, we rank the values of firms’ abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t) by 
magnitude within each industry and year, and classify a firm as under-investing (over-
investing) when its abnormal investment lies above (below) the median of the distribution. 
The results, reported, in columns 9 and 10 of Table 3, confirm once again our hypotheses.  
Finally, we use the approach proposed by Bates (2005) to compute under- and over-
investment and free cash flow. Following this approach, we compute the abnormal 
investment for a given firm in a given year (Iu’_newi,t) as the difference between the firm’s 
new investment expenditure (I_newi,t) and the industry median level of new investment 
(I_newj,t) in that year. This difference (Iu’_newi,t) can be either positive or negative, 
corresponding respectively to over-investment or under-investment18. As for free cash flow 
(FCF’), we compute it as the difference between cash flow generated from assets in place 
(CFAIP,i,t) for each firm in each year and the industry median level in that same year 
(CFAIPj,t)19. Accordingly, FCF’ can be either positive or negative. 
To examine the relationship between these alternative measures of (under- or over-) 
investment and free cash flow, we estimate the following dynamic variant of Eq. (1), where 
DumFCF’>0 is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a positive FCF’i,t, and 0 otherwise: 荊通嫗ｅ券結拳沈┸痛 噺 欠待 髪 欠怠荊通嫗ｅ券結拳沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠態経憲兼庁寵庁嫗苧待 髪 欠戴繋系繋沈┸痛嫗 茅 経憲兼庁寵庁嫦猪待髪 欠替繋系繋沈┸痛嫗 茅 経憲兼庁寵庁嫦苧待 茅 髪欠泰系欠嫌月沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠滞芸沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠胎鯨件権結沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠腿畦訣結沈┸痛髪 欠苔迎頚畦沈┸痛貸怠 髪 欠怠待詣結懸結堅欠訣結沈┸痛貸怠 髪 懸沈 髪 懸痛 髪 懸珍 髪 懸椎 髪 綱沈┸痛    岫ね岻 
We use the system GMM approach (Blundell & Bond, 1998) to estimate Eq. (4), accounting 
for the possible endogeneity of the regressors, as well as for firm-specific and time-invariant 
heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table 4. In line with our previous findings, they 
show that the impact of free cash flow on under-investment is only significantly positive for 
the firms with negative FCF’i,t (column 1), whilst the impact of fee cash flow on over-
investment is only significant for firms with positive FCF’i,t (column 2).  
[Insert Table 4] 
 In summary, we have constructed measures of under- and over-investment and free 
cash flow, and generally found a positive and significant  relationship between investment 
                                                             
18 As the expected investment estimate based on Bates’ method (2005) is an out-of-sample estimate in a group 
of peer companies, this can tackle the concern that the expected investment bas d on Richardson’s (2006) 
method might be endogenous. If measuring abnormal investment using both methods delivers similar results, we 
can conclude that our main results based on Richardson’s (2006) model are not driven by endogeneity. 
19 CFAIP,i,t is calculated as (CFO,i,t - I_main.i,t). 
14 
and free cash flow only for Group 1 firms (under-investing firms with negative FCF) and 
Group 3 firms (over-investing firms with positive FCF). We interpreted these findings as 
evidence in favor of the financing constraints (FC) and agency costs (AC) hypotheses, 
respectively. We next dig deeper into these interpretations by analyzing these sensitivities for 
firms facing higher/lower degrees of financing constraints and agency costs, measured using 
a variety of different criteria. 
 
7. To what extent does heterogeneity in the degree of financing constraints and agency 
costs faced by firms affect the sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash 
flow? 
 
7.1. The financing constraints (FC) hypothesis of under-investment 
 
7.1.1. Measuring financing constraints using the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index and the 
Whited and Wu (WW) index 
We now provide further tests of the financing constraints hypothesis of under-investment. To 
this end, we restrict our sample to under-investing observations, and use two indexes to 
measure firm-specific levels of the constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index (Lamont 
et al. 2001) and the Whited and Wu (WW) index (Whited & Wu 2006). 
Focusing on the former, we note that Kaplan & Zingales (1997) classify their sample 
of US firms into five groups on the basis of their degree of financial constraints based on 
qualitative information contained in the firms’ annual reports, as well as quantitative 
information regarding management’s statements on liquidity. Motivated by Kaplan & 
Zingales (1997), Lamont et al. (2001) perform an ordered Logit estimation of the categories 
of constraints on the following five financial ratios, using the original KZ sample: cash flow 
(CFt, net income + depreciation), dividends (DIVt), cash and cash equivalents (Casht) all 
deflated by beginning of year capital (Kt-1); Tobin’s Q (Qt, market value of equity +market 
value of net debt)/(total assets-net intangible assets)); and debt (Debtt, the sum of the short-
term and long-term debt) to total capital (TKt, sum of debt and equity). We use the estimated 
coefficients that they obtain to construct the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index of financial 
constraints in the following way:  
 
                    
  
1 002 0 283 3 139
39 368 1 315 5
t t t tt 1
t tt 1 t 1             
KZ . * CF / K . * Q . * Debt / TK
. *              DIV / K . * Cash           / K      ( )

 
   
 
15 
A firm with a higher value of the KZ index can be intended to be more financially 
constrained. 
We also use an alternative index of constraints (the WW index), constructed by 
Whited and Wu (2006). This index is a linear function of the following six observable firm 
characteristics: cash flow [CFt/BAt-1, (net income + depreciation)/beginning-of-year book 
assets]; a dividend indicator (DIVPOSt, indicating positive dividends); long-term debt 
(TLTDt/CAt-1, long-term debt to total current assets); Tobin’s Q (Qt); size (LNTAt, natural log 
of the book value of assets); firm real sales growth (SGRt); and industry sales growth (ISGt). 
We compute the WW index as follows, using the estimated coefficients from Whited and 
Wu’s (2006) specification: 
 
 
Once again, a higher value of the WW index is representative of a higher level of financial 
constraints. 
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the two firm-specific indexes of financing 
constraints across the four groups of firms based on their abnormal investments and free cash 
flow. We conduct statistical tests for equality of both sample means (t-test) and sample 
medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) across groups of firms.  
[Insert Table 5] 
According to the financial constraints (FC) hypothesis, firms are more likely to under-
invest if they face a higher degree of financing constraints. To test this hypothesis, we 
compare the two indexes across under-investing firms in Group 1 and Group 2. We find that, 
regardless of whether we use the mean or the median, the level of financial constraints 
(measured using both the KZ and WW indices) for Group 1 (under-investing firms with 
negative FCF) is larger than that for Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF). As 
can be seen from the p-values of both tests, the differences in the means and the medians of 
the indicators between the two groups are generally significant at the 5% level. This suggests 
that differences in the financial constraints faced by firms are a key factor in distinguishing 
between the firms in Group 1 and Group 2. Thus, as discussed in the former section, financial 
constraints may contribute to the higher responsiveness of under-investment to free cash flow 
for the firms in Group 1. 
In order to investigate the extent to which the degree of financial constraints faced by 
0 091 0 062 0 021
0 044 0 035 6
t t tt 1 t 1
t t t
WW . * CF / BA . * DIVPOS . *TLTD / CA
. * LN                         TA . * SG  0.1         02*     ISG        ( )
   
  
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firms affects the sensitivity of under-investment to free cash flow, Table 6 presents fixed 
effects estimates of Eq. (3), which tests the effects of free cash flow on under-investment for 
firms characterized by different degrees of financial constraints, calculated using the KZ 
index (columns 1 and 2) and the WW index (columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and 3, following 
Almeida et al. (2004), we classify firms as facing relatively low (Low_FC=1), medium 
(Medium_FC=1), and high (High_FC=1) financial constraints in a given year if their KZ or 
WW index in that year fall respectively in the bottom three, the middle four, and the top three 
deciles of the distribution of the indexes of all firms operating in the same industry they 
belong to.20 In this way, we allow firms in our sample to transit among financial constraint 
categories each year. In columns 2 and 4, we use a 50% threshold.  
 [Insert Table 6] 
Columns 1 and 3 reveal that for under-investing firms, the higher the KZ index or the 
WW index, the larger the sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow. This suggests 
that sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow tend to increase monotonically 
with the degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Similar results are found in 
columns 2 and 4 when we use a 50% threshold. The p-values of the Wald tests reported at the 
foot of the Table reject the equality of the coefficients of free cash flow between more and 
less financially constrained groups. This supports our Hypotheses 1: for under-investing 
firms, the sensitivities of investment to free cash flow increase with the firm’s degree of 
financial constraints21.  
 
7.1.2.  Further tests: Measuring financing constraints using size and age  
Next, we use different variables based on the a priori likelihood that a firm faces financial 
constraints to test our Hypothesis 1. If our hypothesis holds, we should expect a stronger 
relationship between under-investment and free cash flow for firms which are a priori more 
likely to face financial constraints. Specifically, we focus on firms’ size (total real assets) and 
age, which have been commonly used in the literature to partition firms into a priori more 
and less likely to face financing constraints. Small and young firms might not have a 
sufficiently long track record, leading to increased asymmetric information. In addition, small 
                                                             
20 It is worth mentioning that we do not mean that firms ranked in the top three deciles of the distribution of the 
KZ and WW indices are absolutely financially constrained, while firms in the bottom three deciles are absolutely 
financially unconstrained. Instead, we argue that those firms in the top three deciles are likely to face more 
severe financing constraints than those in the bottom three deciles.    
21 Estimating similar regressions on the sample of over-investing firmsdelivered similar coefficients across the 
groups of firms characterized by different degrees of financing costraints. These results, which are not reported 
for brevity but available on request, confirm that the FC hypothesis is unlikely to hold for over-investing firms. 
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and young firms are typically characterized by high idiosyncratic risk and high bankruptcy 
costs, which might exclude them from credit markets, or make their access to external finance 
more costly (Gertler & Gilchrist 1994; Beck et al. 2005; Clementi & Hopenhayn 2006; 
Guariglia 2008).  
The results are reported in Table 7.  In columns 1 and 3, we define a firm as facing a 
high level of financing constraints (High_FC=1) in a given year if its size (column 1) and age 
(column 3) fall in the top three deciles of the distribution of the assets/age of all firms 
operating in the same industry as that firm in that year. Similarly, we define as firm-years 
facing a medium level of financing constraints (Medium_FC=1) those observations falling in 
the middle four deciles of the distribution, and as firm-years facing a low level of financing 
constraints (Low_FC=1), those observations falling in the bottom three deciles of the 
distribution. In columns 2 and 4, we only consider two categories of firm-years: those facing 
high and low financing constraints split at the median of real assets (column 2) and age 
(column 4).  
The results in column 1 show a clear increasing trend for the coefficients of free cash 
flow, moving from large, to medium sized, to small firms. The Wald test reported at the foot 
of the table shows that the differences in the FCF coefficients between large and small firm-
years are significant at the 1% level. Hence, using firm size as a criterion of financial 
constraints also supports our Hypothesis 1. Similar results are obtained when firm are split in 
two size categories (column 2), and when age is used as a partitioning criterion (columns 3 
and 4)22.  
[Insert Table 7] 
In summary, the results we obtained using conventional variables as proxies for 
financial constraints, which suggests that for under-investing firms, the sensitivities of 
investment to free cash flow increase with the firm’s degree of financial constraints faced by 
firms, are highly consistent with our previous findings and Hypothesis 1. 
 
7.2.  The agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment 
 
7.2.1. Measuring agency costs using the ratio of other receivables to total assets and the 
difference between the blockholder’s controlling and ownership rights  
We now move on to testing the agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment. To this end, 
                                                             
22 Yet, in column 3, the Wald test shows that the difference in the FCF coefficients between older and younger 
firm-years is not statistically significant.  
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we focus on over-investing observations. It has been argued that the conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority investors (tunneling) is widespread in emerging 
markets like China since most listed companies tend to have a concentrated ownership 
structure23. In addition, corporate governance mechanisms and the legal system in China offer 
few options to protect minority shareholders from controlling shareholders (Liu & Lu 2007; 
Jiang et al. 2010).  
Our initial measures of agency costs emphasize therefore the conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority investors. Specifically, following Jiang et al. (2010), 
we first use the ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC) to measure how likely 
controlling shareholders are of expropriating minority investors24. A higher value of OREC 
implies a higher level of expropriation and, hence, a higher level of agency costs. Average 
other receivables in our sample constitute about 4% of total assets, and the maximum value of 
the ratio is around 50%, suggesting a high level of agency costs.  
Next, inspired by Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. 
(2010), we proxy the likelihood to tunnel using a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exhibits a 
difference between its largest shareholder’s (also known as blockholder) controlling right (C) 
and cash flow ownership right (O), and 0 otherwise. In the presence of a divergence between 
her/his controlling right and ownership right, the blockholder may control the firm by only 
holding a relatively low proportion of shares. This is made possible through pyramid 
structures and cross-holding among firms, which often lead to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  
Table 8 presents summary statistics of our two firm-specific indicators of agency costs 
after we categorize firms into the four groups based on their abnormal investments and free 
cash flow. As in Table 5, we conduct statistical tests for the equality of both sample means (t-
test) and sample medians (the Wilcoxon rank-sum test) across groups.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Comparing Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF) with Group 4 (over-
investing firms with negative FCF), we observe that the mean level of agency costs measured 
by both OREC and the percentage of firm-year observations exhibiting a difference between 
the blockholder’s controlling and ownership rights (C/O) are higher for the former group. As 
                                                             
23 In China, the ownership of a single dominant shareholder is typcally much larger than that of the second 
shareholder. 
 24 According to Jiang et al. (2010), “during 1996-2006, tens of billions of RMB were siphoned [through inter-
corporate loans] from hundreds of Chinese listed firms by controlling shareholders” (p.2). The authors explain 
that these inter-corporate loans are typically reported as “other receivables”. This variable is also used by Quian 
and Yeung (2015). 
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for the median, it is higher for Group 3 when we focus on OREC, but equal to 0 for both 
groups of firms when we focus on C/O 25. These statistics suggest that firms in Group 3 suffer 
from higher agency costs than those in Group 4. This is not surprising as these firms dispose 
of a higher FCF, which they can use for tunneling purposes.  
To explore this issue further, Table 9 presents the fixed effects estimates of Eq. (3), 
aimed at testing the effects of changes in free cash flow on over-investment for firms 
characterized by different levels of agency costs measured using OREC (columns 1 and 2) 
and C/O (columns 3). Specifically, in column 1, we classify a firm as facing relatively low 
(Low_AC=1), medium (Medium_AC=1), or high (High_AC=1) agency costs in a given year if 
its OREC ratio in that year falls respectively in the bottom three, the medium four, or the top 
three deciles of the corresponding OREC ratios of all firms operating in the same industry the 
firm belongs to in that year. In column 2, we use a 50% threshold. In both cases, we observe 
that the sensitivity of investment to free cash flow is positive and significant at the 5% level 
or higher only for firms with a high degree of agency costs.  
In column 3, we define a firm as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if it 
exhibits (does not exhibit) a divergence between its blockholder’s controlling ownership and 
cash flow ownership. Only those firms characterized by a divergence exhibit a positive and 
significant sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow26. We can therefore conclude that 
our results generally provide further support to the agency costs (AC) hypothesis27.  
[Insert Table 9] 
 
7.2.2.  Further tests: Measuring agency costs using blockholder’s and CEO shareholding 
To better understand the extent to which agency costs matter for the sensitivity of abnormal 
investment to free cash flow, in this section, we verify whether our results are robust to 
partitioning firms on the basis of other variables which have been used in the literature to 
proxy for the presence of agency problems (Ang et al. 2000, Jiang et al. 2010).  
Our first alternative measure focuses on the percentage of shares controlled by the 
largest shareholder (Blockholderi,t). It has been argued that concentrated ownership is 
                                                             
25 The statistical tests indicate, however, that only the differences in the means and medians of OREC between 
the two groups are statistically significant. In the case of C/O, this is not urprising since the median value of the 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm exhibits a divergence between its blockholder’s controlling and ownership rights, 
and 0 otherwise, is equal to zero for both Group 3 and Group 4. 
26 It should be noted, however, that the Wald tests do not reject the equality of the coefficients of free cash flow 
between firms with high and low agency costs. 
27 Estimating similar regressions on the sample of under-investing firms delivered similar coefficients across the 
groups of firms characterized by different levels of agency costs. These results, which are not reported for 
brevity but available on request, confirm that the AC hypothesis is unlikely to hold for under-investing firms. 
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positively associated with firms’ agency costs. As mentioned earlier, agency costs, arising 
from the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and minority investors, may 
become apparent when the controlling shareholder extracts private benefits from minority 
shareholders (tunneling). The ability of the primary owner to expropriate minority investors 
is expected to increase with his/her ownership. When the interests of the controlling 
shareholder are not aligned with those of other investors, there is in fact good reason to 
believe that the former may use his/her power to influence the firm’s investment decisions to 
promote his/her interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, a high 
concentration of ownership at the firm level may indicates a strong incentive to tunnel and a 
high level of agency costs (Liu & Lu 2007).  
However, as discussed in the previous sub-section, primary owners in China, often 
have rather large power to control the company’s operation even by only holding a relatively 
low stake of shares, through pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. When the 
primary owner’s controlling right is greater than his/her ownership right, he/she tends to 
derive more benefits from tunneling activities. Thus, a lower incentive to tunnel, and lower 
agency costs are expected when the highest percentage of shares is held by the primary owner 
(Jiang et al. 2010). Additionally, investors with a large ownership stake generally have a 
strong interest in the firm’s profit maximization and have a higher incentive to oversee or 
monitor the manger. Hence, agency costs intended as the conflict between firm managers and 
shareholders, tend to decline with the ownership stake of controlling shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Ang et al. 2000). The ownership stake of the controlling shareholder is 
therefore definitely an important determinant of the overall agency costs faced by the firm, 
but whether it affects these agency costs positively or negatively is ambiguous. 
In order to test the extent to which the blockolder’s shareholding affects the sensitivity 
of over-investment to free cash flow, we construct the dummies Low_sharei,t, 
Medium_sharei,t, and High_sharei,t, which are in turn equal to 1 if the blockolder’s 
shareholding of firm i in year t lies respectively in the bottom three, the middle four, and the 
top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding shareholding of all firms operating 
in the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. We then interact these dummies with 
free cash flow and examine the coefficients of the interaction terms in our over-investment 
regressions. 
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 10. Interestingly, we observe that the 
coefficient associated with free cash flow is the largest for the medium shareholding category. 
This suggests that, the sensitivity of over-investment to FCF initially increases with the 
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shares held by the largest shareholder, then decreases.28 These differences between categories 
can be explained in part considering that, as previously discussed, there are arguments both in 
favor and against a positive relationship between the percentage of shares controlled by the 
largest shareholder and agency problems. This finding is in line with Jiang et al. (2010), 
according to which agency costs indicated by tunneling are highest when the largest 
shareholder owns a medium percentage (30%) of the firm’s shares.  
Our next measure of agency costs is motivated by international evidence that agency 
costs may arise when managerial interests are not in line with those of the firm’s 
shareholders. Managerial ownership tends to relieve principal-agent problems between 
(outside) shareholders and managers. Thus, agency costs arising from the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders should be lower at firms managed by a shareholder.29 In 
order to test whether this is the case, we construct a dummy variable Insideri,t (Outsideri,t), 
which is equal to one if a firm is managed by a shareholder (outsider), and 0 otherwise. 
Specifically, if the top executives, including the CEO, are holding any of their own shares, 
they will be considered as insiders. We then interact free cash flow with the Insideri,t and 
Outsideri,t dummies and examine the differences in the coefficients associated with the two 
interaction terms in our over-investment regressions. 
The results appear in column 2 of Table 10. We observe that a firm managed by an 
outsider has a significantly higher sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow. This can 
be explained considering that outside managers may not have closely aligned interests with 
the firm’s shareholders and suggests that managerial ownership is negatively associated with 
the firm’s principal-agent problems. 30  Thus, for over-investing firms, agency problems 
between entrenched managers and shareholders contribute to higher sensitivities of over-
investment to free cash flow.  
[Insert Table 10] 
In summary, these findings are strongly aligned with our previous results and 
                                                             
28 It should be noted, however, that p-values associated with the Wald tests cannot significantly reject the 
equality of the impact of free cash flow on investment between firmscharacterized by different percentages of 
shares owned by the largest shareholders. 
29 This can be explained considering that inside managers may have interests more closely aligned with the 
firm’s shareholders. Jensen & Meckling (1976) propose a hypothesis of convergence of interests between 
shareholders and managers, and improvement of corporate performance as managerial ownership increases. 
Kren & Kerr (1997), Ang et al. (2000), Singh & Davidson III (2003), and McKnight & Weir (2009) also 
provide support for the argument that managerial ownership reduces agency costs. 
30 In our sample, there is often separation between management and ownership. In addition, those few managers 
who are also shareholders in their company only hold a small percentage of th ir own shares. Relative low 
ownership stakes prevent managers from pursuing their own interests at the expense of shareholders, as they are 
supervised and controlled by the board, as well as by capital markets.  
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Hypothesis 2: The sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow rises with the degree 
of agency costs faced by over-investing firms. 
 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we provide a portrait of the nature and balance of financial constraints and 
agency problems in China, giving a picture of the extent to which the economy has suffered 
from efficiency losses due to both under- and over-investment. Two significant conclusions 
emerge from our main findings: On the one hand, the limited access to capital markets which 
characterizes many Chinese firms leads to significant under-investment. On the other hand, 
the weak corporate governance structures lead managers or controlling shareholders to over-
invest their free cash flow in projects with negative NPV.   
The identification of financial constraints and agency problems as explanations for 
under- and over-investment suggests that in order to improve investment efficiency in China, 
both the financial and the legal system need to be reformed. In particular, since China’s 
financial system is still dominated by under-developed state-owned banks, in order to sustain 
the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, especially in the private sector, more widespread 
access to credit markets should be a priority in order to increase firms’ investment efficiency. 
In the long run, the establishment of an effective credit-rating system and the development of 
equity finance could be a way to achieve this target.  
In addition, considering that China’s listed firms are still dominated by state 
shareholders, a further reduction in state ownership may need to be carried out to reduce 
conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and to 
increase the intensity of monitoring by other shareholders or independent institutions. This is 
particularly important at the local level. Imposing constraints or more restrictive regulations 
to local government bureaucrats to prevent them from making adverse decisions such as 
expropriation and misappropriation of funds, which ultimately lead to over-investment, 
should therefore be on the political agenda.  
Positive steps in both directions have already been taken. With regards to financing 
constraints, the recent reforms to the financial system documented in Borst and Lardy (2015) 
are likely to have played an important role in making finance more accessible, to the extent 
that Lardy (2014) documents a significant increase in the flow of loans to the previously 
financially discriminated against private sector in recent years. Focusing on agency costs, 
Cumming et al. (2012) and Hou et al. (2012) argue that the 2005 split share structure reform, 
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which allowed restricted shares held mainly by state shareholders to become tradable, and 
permitted equity-based compensation for executives or directors, enhanced the incentives of 
controlling state shareholders to monitor managers, ensuring they were disciplined against 
opportunistic behavior and refrained from the expropriation of minority shareholders31. Yet, 
despite these positive steps, more work needs to be done to completely eradicate investment 




1. Structure of the panel 
Table A1 illustrates the structure of our panel. Table A2 presents the per year distribution of 
observations in our dataset. 
 
2. Definitions of the variables used  
Market value of assets: sum of market value of tradable stocks, book value of non-tradable 
stocks, and market value of net debt. 
Tobin’s Q: ratio of market value of assets to book value of total assets. 
Return on assets (ROA): ratio of net income to total assets. 
Leverage: ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets. 
Cash: ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. 
Size: natural logarithm of total assets. 
Age: number of years since listing. 
Sales growth: rate of growth of real sales. 
CAPEX: capital expenditures, i.e. cash paid to acquire and construct fixed assets, intangible 
assets and other long-term assets. 
SalePPE: sale of property, plant and equipment, i.e. net cash received from disposals of fixed 
assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets. 
I_total: total investment, i.e. capital expenditure less receipts from sale of property, plant and 
equipment (CAPEX – SalePPE). 
I_main.: investment to maintain existing assets in place (depreciation + amortization). 
                                                             
31 To provide evidence on the effectiveness of these positive steps in reducing investment inefficiency in China, 
we investigated whether the sensitivities of both under- and over-investment to free cash flow change before and 
after 2008. We found a significant decline in the sensitivities of under-i v stment to free cash flow in the post-
2008 period. Yet, these sensitivities remained positive and highly significant, which suggest that financing 
constraints did not disappear. As for the sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow, they became 
insignificant in the post-2008 period. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. 
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I_new: total investment less investment to maintain existing assets in place (I_total - 
I_main.).  
Ie_new: expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects.  
Iu_new: unexpected or abnormal investment expenditure.  
CFO: net cash flow from operating activities, i.e. difference between cash inflow from 
operating activities and cash outflow from operating activities. 
CFAIP: cash flow generated from assets in place (CFO - I_main.). 
FCF: free cash flow (CFO- I_main. -Ie_new). 
Deflator: The GDP deflator, which is obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, is used to convert all variables to real terms. 
Industries: According to the industry classification taken from the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), firms in China’s listed sector are assigned to one of the 
following twelve industrial sectors: Farming, forestry, animal husbandry & fishing; Mining; 
Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Transportation & warehouse; Information technology; 
Wholesale & retailing; Real estate; Social services; Communications & cultural;  
Conglomerates; Finance and insurance. Following previous literature, we exclude the Finance 
& insurance sector from our study. 
Provinces: There are 31 provinces in China: Coastal provinces (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang); Central 
provinces (Chongqing, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and 
Shanxi); and Western provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Neimenggu, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan ). 
 
3.  Estimates of the dynamic model of investment expenditure (Eq. 1) 
Table A3 provides the fixed effects (Fe), and system GMM estimates of our dynamic model 
of investment expenditure outlined in Eq. (1). It is worth noting that in a dynamic panel 
setting, the fixed effects estimator suffers from endogeneity problems. Our preferred 
estimator is therefore the system Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM) developed 
by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). This estimator enables us to 
control for omitted variables bias, the possible endogeneity of the regressors, as well as firm-
specific and time-invariant heterogeneity. Lagged values of the independent variables are 
used as instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of the regressors (Baum 2006; 
Roodman 2009). 
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In order to evaluate the validity of instruments and the correct specification of the 
model, two diagnostic tests are used in our GMM estimations. The first is the Hansen (J) test 
for over-identifying restrictions. The second, m(n), tests for the nth order serial correlation of 
the differenced residuals, and provides a further test for the validity of the specification of the 
model and the legitimacy of instruments. If the m(n) test rejects the null hypothesis, the 
instruments need to be lagged at least n+1 times. Since our models generally reject the null 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation when the instruments are lagged twice, levels 
of the endogenous variables dated t-3 and further are used as instruments in the first-
differenced equations, and first-differences of the endogenous variables dated t-2 are used as 
additional instruments in the level equations (Baum 2006; Roodman 2009).32 
[Insert Table A3] 
Column 1 reports the fixed effects estimates, which remove the effect of time-
invariant firm characteristics. The と coefficient indicates that around 33% of the total error 
variance is explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Column 2 presents the estimates obtained 
using our preferred system GMM estimator, which takes unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity simultaneously into account. More specifically, we treat I_newi,t, Cash i,t, Qi,t, 
Sizei,t, ROAi,t, and Leveragei,t as potentially endogenous variables and instrument them using 
their own values lagged 3 to 6 times. First-differences of these same variables lagged twice 
are used as additional instruments in the level equations. Statistical diagnostics (the Hansen J 
test and the m(3) test) do not reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity and/or model 
specification. The system GMM estimate of the coefficient associated with the lagged 
dependent variable, I_newi,t-1, is 0.411. This positive and precisely determined coefficient 
suggests that investment behavior is sluggish and smooth. In addition, firms’ new investment 
expenditure (I_newi,t) goes up following increases in cash holdings and ROA, and declines 
with age. It is interesting to note that Tobin’s Q exhibits a poorly determined coefficient, 
while ROA has a positive and precisely determined coefficient. The profitability of Chinese 
firms has therefore a greater impact on their investment than the market valuation on 
investment. This is consistent with the finding from Wang et al. (2009), who show that in 
inefficient markets like China, higher profits are associated with higher investment.   
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Note: I_totali,t = CAPEXi,t - SalePPEi,t (Capital expenditure- sale of property, plant, and equipment);  
I_main.i,t = Depreciationi,t + Amortizationi,t; 
I_newi,t = I_totali,t - I_main.i,t;  
CFOi,t = Net cash flow from operating activities; 
CFAIP,i,t = Cash flow generated from assets in place; 
FCFi,t =CFAIP,i,t - Ie_newi,t =CFOi,t- I_main.i,t - Ie_newi,t. 





   











































Sample means and medians (in parentheses) 
 
G1 G2 G3 G4 Total 
Diff  
(G1 vs. G3) 
I_total 0.0353 0.0304 0.0826 0.1034 0.0584 0.00*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0248) (0.0714) (0.0918) (0.041) 0.00*** 
I_new 0.0053 -0.0034 0.0522 0.0769 0.0282 0.00*** 
 (0.0025) (-0.0025) (0.0401) (0.0659) (0.0135) 0.00*** 
Ie_new 0.034 0.0213 0.0154 0.0387 0.0282 0.00*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0182) (0.0139) (0.0357) (0.0242) 0.00*** 
Iu_new -0.0287 -0.0246 0.0368 0.0383 0 0.00*** 
 (-0.0233) (-0.0201) (0.0224) (0.0239) (-0.0061) 0.00*** 
FCF -0.0622 0.0552 0.0569 -0.0562 -0.0079 0.00*** 
 (-0.0462) (0.0408) (0.0425) (-0.0439) (-0.0077) 0.00*** 
Cash 0.168 0.194 0.142 0.139 0.163 0.00*** 
 (0.136) (0.16) (0.118) (0.12) (0.133) 0.00*** 
Q 1.885 2.049 2.016 1.818 1.937 0.00*** 
 (1.498) (1.583) (1.579) (1.486) (1.527) 0.00*** 
Size 20.62 20.73 20.79 20.84 20.73 0.00*** 
 (20.49) (20.59) (20.68) (20.71) (20.6) 0.00*** 
Age 9.1 10.3 10.6 9.3 9.8 0.00*** 
 (8) (10) (10) (9) (9) 0.00*** 
ROA 0.014 0.045 0.039 0.025 0.029 0.00*** 
 (0.025) (0.041) (0.039) (0.028) (0.032) 0.00*** 
Leverage 0.215 0.171 0.201 0.239 0.207 0.00*** 
 (0.205) (0.147) (0.182) (0.231) (0.192) 0.00*** 
Observations 6,355 4,820 3,785 4,230 19,190  
Notes: Firms are classified into four groups according their level of abnormal investment and FCF (free cash flow): Group 1 (under-
investing firms with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive 
FCF); Group 4 (over-investing firms with negative FCF). Total investment (I_totali,t) is defined as capital expenditure less receipts 
from the sale of property, plant and equipment. I_new is total investment less investment to maintain existing assets in place. Ie_new 
represents the expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects. Iu_new represents the abnormal investment (under- or 
over- investment). FCF is free cash flow which is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from operating activities 
(CFO). Cash is the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Q is the market-to-book ratio. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Age is the number of years elapsed since the firm listed. ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of the 
sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. All variable except Size and Age are expressed in percentage terms. All investment 
expenditure variables are scaled by total assets. All variables except Age are deflated using the GDP deflator. See the Appendix for 
complete definitions of all variables. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in 
means and equality of medians of corresponding variables between firms in Group 1 and those in Group 3. *, **, *** indicates 










(Under- or over-) investment-free cash flow sensitivities 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Iu_newi,t Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_fe Over_fe 
Dum_FCF>0 0.001** -0.001 0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FCF*Dum_FCF<0 0.060*** 0.014 0.044*** 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.012) 
FCF*Dum_FCF>0 0.015** 0.028** 0.013* 0.027** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.20 
ぅ 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.39 
Prob>F(overall fit) 34.27 8.23 18.84 6.84 
Diff 0.00*** 0.49 0.00*** 0.27 
Observations 11,175 8,015 10,541 8,649 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all 
variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity). と represents the proportion of the total error variance 
accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting 
Richardson’s (2006) method, where over-investing (under-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal 
investment (Iu_newi,t). FCF is free cash flow which is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from operating activities 
(CFO).  Dum_FCF<0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm’s free cash flow in that year is negative (FCF<0), and 
0 otherwise. Dum_FCF>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm’s free cash flow in that year is positive (FCF>0), 
and 0 otherwise. Under_gmm (Over_gmm) and Under_fe (Over_fe) refer to abnormal investment obtained by estimating Eq. (1) using 
the system GMM and the fixed effects estimator, respectively (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic 
for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients for firms facing positive and negative FCF. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
(Under- or over-) investment-free cash flow sensitivities: further tests 
    
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable:  Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm 
Iu_newi,t 20
th Quant  20th Quant 50th Quant 50th Quant 80th Quant 80th Quant   <50th >50th 
 Most under-investment —› Most over-investment     
Dum_FCF>0 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001* -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.002** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
FCF*Dum_FCF<0 0.090*** 0.015* 0.054*** 0.006 0.033*** 0.004 0.043*** 0.007 0.057*** 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.013) 
FCF*Dum_FCF>0 0.020 0.020*** 0.013** 0.043*** 0.009 0.061** 0.004 0.028* 0.015** 0.036*** 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.027) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects no no no no no no yes yes yes Yes 
(Pseudo) R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.34 
Adjusted R2  
     
0.31 0.24 0.22 0.16 
と       0.37 0.40 0.36 0.35 
Prob>F(overall fit)  
     
19.77 11.95 35.77 5.72 
Diff 0.00*** 0.66 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.10* 0.00*** 0.40 0.00*** 0.19 
Observations 11,175 8,015 11,175 8,015 11,175 8,015 13,119 8,678 9,599 9,591 
Notes: The specifications in columns 1 to 6 were estimated using a quantile estimator with fixed effects, and those in columns 7 to 10, using a fixed effects estimator. For the quantile regression, we run 
separate regressions for the 20th, 50th, 80th quantiles of abnormal investment with bootstrapped standard errors (1000 repetitions). Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the 
regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated using Richardson’s (2006) method, where  in columns 1 to 6, under-investing 
(over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t).  In columns 7 and 8, under-/over-investment are obtained from the estimation of Eq (1) separately in each year 
using OLS. In columns 9 and 10, we define under- (over-investment)  when in a given year, firm i’s abnormal investment is below (above) the median value of the distribution of the abnormal investment of all 
firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in that year. FCF is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_FCF<0 is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm’s free cash flow in that year is negative (FCF<0), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm’s free cash flow in that year is 
positive (FCF>0), and 0 otherwise. For the fixed effects regression in columns 7 to 10, と represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Diff is the p-value of 





(Under- or over-) investment-free cash flow sensitivities: using Bates (2005)’s definitions of abnormal  




Under_ gmm Over_ gmm 
Iu’_newi,t-1 0.267*** -0.001 
 
(0.020) (0.027) 
Dum_FCF’>0 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
FCF’i,t*Dum_FCF’<0 0.091*** 0.002 
 (0.033) (0.061) 
FCF’i,t*Dum_FCF’>0 0.001 0.142*** 
 
(0.037) (0.052) 
Cashi,t-1 0.154*** 0.182*** 
 (0.012) (0.019) 
Qi,t-1 -0.002* -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Sizei,t-1 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Agei,t 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAi,t-1 0.106*** 0.204*** 
 (0.017) (0.055) 
Leveragei,t-1 0.012 0.048** 
 
(0.008) (0.019) 
Year-fixed effects yes yes 
Industry-fixed effects yes yes 
Province-fixed effects yes yes 
Prob>F(overall fit) 21.31 8.21 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.00*** 0.00*** 
m2/m3 test (p-value) 0.01** 0.12 
Diff 0.09* 0.09* 
Observations 9,789 9,401 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the system GMM estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of 
all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Adopting the method of Bates (2005), the 
dependent variable is Iu’_newi,t, the difference between a firm’s new investment expenditure (I_new i,t) in a given year and that of 
the median firm in the industry in which the firm operates (I_newt) in that year. Under-investing (over-investing) firms are 
characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (Iu’_newi,t ). FCF’i,t is calculated as the difference between the firm’s 
cash flow generated from assets in place in a given year (CFAIP,i,t) and that of the median firm in the industry in which the firm 
operates in that year (CFAIP,i.). Dum_FCF’<0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm’s CFAIP,i,t is below 
its optimal level (proxied by the firm’s industry’s median CFAIP,i.), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF’>0 is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to 1 in a given year if a firm’s CFAIP,i,t exceeds its optimal level (i.e. the median of the firm’s industry’s CFAIP,i.), and 0 
otherwise. All variables except Qi,t-1, Sizei,t-1 and Agei,t are scaled by total assets. m2/m3 is a test for (second-) third-order serial 
correlation of the residuals in the differenced equations, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
We treat Iu’_new, FCF’, Cash, Q, Size, ROA, and Leveragei,t as potentially endogenous variables. Levels of these variables lagged 
twice or longer are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged 
once, as additional instruments in the level equations. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow 







Summary statistics of financial constrains (KZ and WW indexes) for under- and over- investing firms 
  FC index Mean St. Dev. P25 P50 P75 N Obs 
G1 KZ -5.131 15.115 -4.672 -0.804 0.866 6,351 
Under_ FCF<0 WW -0.941 0.073 -0.986 -0.942 -0.890 6,347 
G2 KZ -5.639 14.554 -5.529 -1.370 0.604 4,819 
Under_ FCF>0 WW -0.951 0.073 -0.997 -0.953 -0.900 4,818 
Diff (G1 vs. G2) KZ 0.04** 
 
Diff (G1 vs. G2) 0.00*** 
  
(Mean) WW 0.00***   (Median) 0.00***     
G3 KZ -3.973 12.692 -3.860 -0.815 0.770 3,782 
Over_ FCF>0 WW -0.955 0.080 -1.004 -0.957 -0.900 3,779 
G4 KZ -3.716 11.725 -3.678 -0.846 0.712 4,230 
Over_ FCF<0 WW -0.955 0.071 -1.000 -0.956 -0.909 4,227 
Diff (G3 vs. G4) KZ 0.17 
 
Diff (G3 vs. G4) 0.83 
  
(Mean) WW 0.74   (Median) 0.53     
Total KZ -4.719 13.838 -4.425 -0.945 0.752 19,182 
  WW -0.949 0.074 -0.995 -0.951 -0.899 19,171 
Notes: KZ and WW represent firm-specific levels of financial constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index (Lamont et al. 2001) and the Whited and Wu (WW) index (Whited & Wu 2006). Firms are classified into 
the following four groups: Group 1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 4 (over-investing firms 
with negative FCF). P25 (50/75) is the 25th (50th/75th) percentile of the respective distribution. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in means and equality of 
medians of the KZ (WW) indexes between groups of under-investing firms (Group 1 and Group 2) or between groups of over-investing firms (Group 3 and Group 4 ). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 




Table 6   
 Under-investment-free cash flow sensitivities: accounting for financial constraints using the KZ and WW 
indexes 
Dependent variable: Iu_newi,t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
KZ_under KZ_under WW_under WW_under 
Medium_FC(30-70) 0.001  -0.002***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
High_FC(>70) 0.003***  -0.002**  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
FCFi,t*  Low_FC(<30) 0.036***  0.036***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  
FCFi,t*  Medium_FC(30-70) 0.050***  0.043***  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
FCFi,t*  High_FC(>70) 0.054***  0.057***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  
High_FC(<50)  0.002***  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
FCFi,t*  Low_FC(<50)  0.040***  0.039*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
FCFi,t*  High_FC(>50)  0.054***  0.053*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
と 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Prob>F(overall fit) 30.30 33.51 30.55 33.07 
Diff 0.01** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Observations 11,170 11,170 11,165 11,165 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all 
variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. と represents the proportion of the total error variance 
accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting 
Richardson’s (2006) method, where under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment 
(Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). High_FC, 
Medium_FC and Low_FC are dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a firm faces high, medium, or low financial constraints, and 
0 otherwise. Specifically, in columns 1 and 3, we consider a firm to be financially constrained (unconstrained) in a given year if its KZ 
or WW index lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding variables for all firms belonging to the same 
industry in that year. The remaining firm-years will be the ones who face a medium level of financial constraints. In columns 2 and 4, a 
firm is considered to be financially constrained in a given year if its KZ or WW index exceeds the median value of the index calculated 
in the industry  the firm belongs to in that year, and financially unconstrained otherwise. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the 
equality of the free cash flow coefficients across various categories of firms. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 



















Under-investment-free cash flow sensitivities: accounting for financial constraints 
using size and age 
Dependent variable:  
Iu_newi,t  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Assets Total Assets Age Age 
Low_FC(<30) 0.007***  0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
Medium_FC(30-70) 0.004***  0.003***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
FCFi,t*  Low_FC(<30) 0.039***  0.040***  
 (0.006)  (0.005)  
FCFi,t*  Medium_FC(30-70) 0.038***  0.046***  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
FCFi,t*  High_FC(>70) 0.064***  0.052***  
 (0.005)  (0.006)  
High_ FC(>50)  0.004***  0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
FCFi,t *  Low_ FC(<50)  0.037***  0.042*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
FCFi,t *  High_ FC (>50)  0.055***  0.051*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes yes yes 
R2 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
と 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 
F-value 33.39 35.34 30.68 32.86 
Diff 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.12 0.08* 
Observations 11,175 11,175 11,175 11,175 
Notes:  All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors 
(in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. と 
represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The 
dependent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson’s method (2006), 
where under-investing firms are characterized by negative abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t is 
computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO).  
Low_FC, Medium_FC, and High_FC are dummy variables equal to 1 in a given year, respectively, if the 
firm is likely to face low, medium, and high financial constraints relatively to all firms operating in the 
same industry it belongs to in that year, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2, we consider a 
firm facing low (high) financial constraints in a given year if its size (real total assets) and age respectively 
lie in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of the corresponding values of all firms belonging to the same 
industry in that year. In columns 2 and 4, we consider a firm facing low (high) financial constraints in a 
given year if its size (real total assets) and age respectively lie in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of 
the corresponding variables of all firms belonging to the same industry in that year. The remaining firm-
years will be those who face a medium level of financial constraints. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic 
for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across various categories of firms. *, **, *** indicates 






Summary statistics of agency costs (OREC and C/O) for under- and over- investing firms 
 
FC index Mean St. Dev. P25 P50 P75 N Obs 
G1 OREC 0.054 0.114 0.026 0.041 0.054 6,352 
Under_ FCF<0 C/O 46.70% 49.90% 0 0 1 4,869 
G2 OREC 0.218 11.375 0.029 0.047 0.069 4,819 
Under_ FCF>0 C/O 48.43%  0 0 1 3,669 
Diff (G1 vs. G2) OREC 0.00***  Diff (G1 vs. G2) 0.00***   
(Mean) C/O 0.06*  (Median) 0.11   
G3 OREC 0.055 0.094 0.026 0.044 0.067 4,228 
Over_ FCF>0 C/O 46.70% 49.90% 0 0 1 3,357 
G4 OREC 0.044 0.045 0.022 0.037 0.055 3,783 
Over_ FCF<0 C/O 45.34% 49.79% 0 0 1 2,880 
Diff (G3 vs. G4) OREC 0.00***  Diff (G3 vs. G4) 0.00***   
(Mean) C/O 0.14  (Median) 0.28   
Total OREC 0.093 5.702 0.026 0.042 0.063 19,182 
 
C/O 46.8% 49.90% 0 0 1 14,775 
Notes: OREC (other receivable scaled by total assets) and C/O (dummy equal to 1 if the firm exhibits a divergence between controlling and ownership rights, and 0 otherwise) represent firm-specific levels of agency 
costs. Firms are classified into the following four groups: Group 1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF); 
Group 4 (over-investing firms with negative FCF). P25 (50/75) is the 25th (50th/75th) percentile of the distribution of the relevant variable. Diff is the p-value associated with the  t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
differences in means and equality of medians of the firm-level  agency costs between groups of under-investing firms (Group 1 and Group 2) or between groups of over-investing firms (Group 3  and Group 4). *, **, 







Table 9   
Over-investment-free cash flow sensitivities: accounting for agency costs using OREC and C/O 
Dependent variable: Iu_newi,t 
(1) (2)  (3) 
OREC OREC  C/O 
Medium_ AC(30-70) -0.001    
 (0.001)    
High_ AC(>70) -0.007***    
 (0.002)    
FCFi,t*  Low_ AC(<30) 0.015    
 (0.012)    
FCFi,t*  Medium_ AC(30-70) 0.013    
 (0.011)    
FCFi,t*  High_ AC(>70) 0.028**    
 (0.012)    
High_AC(>50)  -0.006***  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
FCFi,t*  Low_AC(<50)  0.016*  0.016 
  (0.010)  (0.011) 
FCFi,t*  High_ AC(>50)  0.021**  0.031*** 
  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes  yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes  yes 
R2 0.38 0.38  0.42 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.18  0.18 
ぅ 0.37 0.37  0.40 
Prob>F(overall fit) 8.37 9.37  8.64 
Diff 0.47 0.71  0.35 
Observations 8,015 8,015  6,237 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables 
in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. と represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by 
unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated using Richardson’s (2006) method, 
where under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t is computed 
by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow operating from activities (CFO). High_AC, Medium_AC and Low_AC are 
dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a firm faces respectively high, medium, and low agency costs compared to all firms 
belonging to the same industry it belongs to, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, in columns 1, we define a firm as facing high (low) agency 
costs in a given year if its OREC lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the ORECs of all firms operating in its same 
industry in that year. The remaining firm-years will be the ones with medium agency costs. The remaining firm-years will be the ones who 
face a medium level of agency costs. As for column 2, a firm is considered as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its OREC 
exceeds (is below) the median value of the distribution of the ORECs of all firms operating in the same industry it belongs to in that year. 
In columns 3, a firm is considered as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its blockholder’s controlling right exceeds (does not 
exceed) its cash-flow right in a given year. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across 































Insider  0.002 
 
 (0.002) 
FCFi,t*  Outsider  0.031*** 
 
 (0.010) 
FCFi,t*  Insider   0.016 
 
 (0.015) 
Medium_ Share(30-70) -0.000  
 (0.002)  
High_ Share (>70) -0.001  
 (0.002)  
FCFi,t*  Low_ Share (<30) 0.016  
 (0.012)  
FCFi,t*  Medium_ Share (30-70) 0.023**  
 (0.011)  
FCFi,t*  High_ Share (>70) 0.014  
 (0.012)  
Firm-fixed effects Yes yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes yes 
R2 0.38 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.16 
ぅ 0.37 0.40 
F-value 7.40 7.19 
Diff(Low VS Medium)  0.66  
Diff (Medium VS High) 0.58  
Diff (Low VS High) 0.92 0.40 
Observations 8,015 6,146 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables 
in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. と represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by 
unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson’s (2006) method, 
where over-investing firms are characterized by positive abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t  is computed by subtracting the optimal 
level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Blockhoder is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest 
shareholder. High_Share (Low_Share) is a dummy variable equal to 1 in a given year if the percentage of shares controlled by the 
blockholder in a given firm lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding percentage of all firms operating in 
the same industry in that year, and 0 otherwise. For the remaining firm-years, the dummy Medium_Share will be equal to 1. In the column 
labeled Shareholding_CEO, Insider(Outsider) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s CEO is (not) holding shares in 
his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across 







Structure of the unbalance panel 
No. of obs. Per firm No. of obs. Percent Cumulative 
3 279 1.25% 1.25% 
4 704 3.15% 4.39% 
5 1,055 4.72% 9.11% 
6 510 2.28% 11.39% 
7 840 3.75% 15.14% 
8 1,024 4.58% 19.72% 
9 756 3.38% 23.1% 
10 830 3.71% 26.81% 
11 1,320 5.9% 32.71% 
12 1,560 6.97% 39.68% 
13 1,638 7.32% 47% 
14 2,212 9.89% 56.89% 
15 2,655 11.87% 68.76% 
16 2,944 13.16% 81.92% 
17 4,046 18.08% 100% 




Distribution of firm-year observations by year 
Year No. of obs. Percent Cumulative 
1998 576 2.57% 2.57% 
1999 689 3.08% 5.65% 
2000 791 3.54% 9.19% 
2001 867 3.88% 13.06% 
2002 953 4.26% 17.32% 
2003 1,046 4.68% 22% 
2004 1,127 5.04% 27.04% 
2005 1,129 5.05% 32.08% 
2006 1,165 5.21% 37.29% 
2007 1,358 6.07% 43.36% 
2008 1,477 6.6% 49.96% 
2009 1,554 6.95% 56.91% 
2010 1,763 7.88% 64.79% 
2011 1,896 8.47% 73.26% 
2012 2,026 9.06% 82.32% 
2013 2,012 8.99% 91.31% 
2014 1,944 8.69% 100% 








Dynamic model of investment expenditure 
  
Dependent variable: I_newi,t 
(1) (2) 
Fixed effects GMM_system 
I_newi,t-1 0.324*** 0.411*** 
 (0.007) (0.030) 
Cashi,t-1 0.103*** 0.098*** 
 (0.004) (0.012) 
Qi,t-1 0.001** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Sizei,t-1 -0.004*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Agei,t -0.002 -0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
ROAi,t-1 0.082*** 0.121*** 
 (0.006) (0.025) 
Leveragei,t-1 -0.024*** 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.010) 
Year-fixed effects yes yes 
Industry-fixed effects no yes 
Province-fixed effects no yes 
(Year-fixed)* (Industry-fixed) effects yes yes 
R2 0.49  
Adjusted R2 0.42  
と 0.33  
F-value 26.21 17.51 
Hansen J test (p-value) 
 
0.13 
m3 test (p-value) 
 
0.54 
Observations 19,190 19,190 
Notes: Estimates in column 1 were obtained using the fixed effects estimator. Estimates in column 2 were obtained 
using the system GMM estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions 
are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Adopting Richardson’s (2006) method, the dependent variable is 
I_newi,t, the difference between Itotal and Imain (see Fig. 1 for definitions of these variables).. All variables except Qi,t-1, 
Sizei,t-1 and Agei,t are scaled by total assets. For the fixed effects regression, と represents the proportion of the total error 
variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. For the system GMM regression, m3 is a test for third-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The 
Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat 
I_newi,t-1, Cash i,t-1, Qi,t-1, Size i,t-1, ROAi,t-1  and Leveragei,t-1 as potentially endogenous variables; levels of these variables 
dated t-3 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these same 
variables lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level equations. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
